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Abstract  
The empirical literature on the political economy of finance emphasizes the importance of 
political institutions as crucial determinants of financial development and shows that 
democratic regimes are positively and robustly correlated with financial development. By 
using a three years periodic panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that 
democratic regimes appear to be significantly and positively correlated with financial 
development, but the opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to 
account for differentials in financial development between countries. Indeed, our results 
highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic regimes 
and financial development since the positive effect induced by democracies on financial 
development is explained by the presence of specific democratic political institutions, 
namely: parliamentary form of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. Thus, 
democracies seem to better foster financial development if its constitutional arrangement 
allows horizontal flexibility and vertical stability in the political decision-making process. 
Keywords: financial development; political institutions; positive constitutional economics; 
comparative politics. 
JEL classification codes: D72, G28, H00, P48. 
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Introduction:  
The economic literature, either theoretical or empirical, highlights a positive impact of financial 
development not only on economic growth (Schumpeter, 1911; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997, 
2005), but also on the improvement of population’s well-being at macroeconomic level (Beck et al., 
2007 ; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2008 ; Guillaumont-Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). This is why, 
understanding the determinants of financial development has become an important issue addressed in 
the recent literature (Voghouei et al., 2011a). In this perspective, institutions are considered as long-
run determinants of financial development.  
Literature show that democratic political institutions have a positive effect on financial development 
through two key institutional mechanisms: (i) more constrains on the discretion of political power and 
(ii) more participation of populations in the political decision-making process (Haber and Perotti, 
2008). However, these works are mostly limited to the opposition between democracies and 
dictatorships (Girma and Shortland, 2004; Huang, 2010; Voghouei et al. 2011b; Yang, 2011).  
Therefore, we claim that the opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to 
understand thoroughly the effect of political institutions on financial development.
 1
  Indeed, as 
Acemoglu (2005) mentioned, the notion of democratic regime indiscriminately gathers a set of 
economic institutions (i.e., the limitation of government’s expropriation power allowing to strengthen 
property rights) and political institutions (i.e., the various constitutional rules in place in a given 
political system). Consequently, it turns out to be necessary to open the institutional black-box 
associated to democratic regimes, in order to have a better understanding of the democracies-financial 
development nexus. 
By using a database on the broadest possible sample of countries from all levels of development 
(between 140 and 97 countries depending on specifications) over 1984-2007 in a three years periodic 
panel, we proceed to the disaggregation of the overall effect of democratic regimes on financial 
development according to the three most representative institutional features of a democratic system 
namely:  forms of government, electoral rules and state forms.
2
 In reference to previous empirical 
studies related to the relationship between political institutions and financial development (Huang, 
2010; Voghouei et al. 2011b), we use a financial development indicator reflecting the depth of 
financial activities in the form of a composite index extracted from a principal component analysis. 
Finally, in order to empirically assess the effect of highly inertial institutional variables characterized 
by a non-random selection pattern, we use systematically two types of econometric estimators, namely 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator 
(Plümper-Troeger, 2007, 2011). 
The main results derived from our estimates show that the effect of democratic regimes on financial 
development is all the more important that democracies have a parliamentary form of government and 
to a lesser extent a federal state form. These results show that, contrary to the traditional opposition 
between centralist and decentralist paradigms in political governance theories, the “optimal” 
institutional configuration,  in order to promote the depth of financial activities, combines weak 
horizontal separation of powers (parliamentary form of government) and strong vertical separation of 
powers (federal state form). It reflects the constitutional configuration of countries like Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Pakistan and Spain for instance. 
                                                          
1 Voigt (2011) insists on the need to overcome the opposition between democracies and dictatorships, insofar as this dichotomy seems far too 
simple to characterize the complexity of political institutions associated to each democratic regime. 
2
 In the comparative politics literature, these three democratic political institutions are considered as the most representative features of a 
democratic system (Gerring et al., 2005). 
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Our study plan is divided into four parts. Section I briefly reviews the various fields of literature 
covered by this article. Section II presents our econometric methodology. Section III provides a first 
overview of the relationship between forms of democracies and financial development using 
descriptive statistics and then details results associated to our econometric analysis. Section IV 
concludes mentioning its political implications and its potential developments. 
Section I: Literature review 
a. Political institutions and financial development:  
The literature on determinants of financial development has identified four categories of institutions, 
namely cultural institutions (norms and beliefs), legal institutions (type of legal system, definition and 
application of the rules of law), economic institutions (rules governing the process of production, 
allocation and distribution of goods and services) and political institutions (political regimes and 
constitutional rules).  
In this article we focus on the latter type of institutions. Taking the institutional categories of 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), cultural, legal and economic institutions characterized horizontal 
institutions, i.e. governing interactions between individuals, while political institutions characterized 
vertical institutions, i.e. governing interactions between political power and individuals.
3
 Although 
economic institutions constitute a first-order determinant of financial development, they are, in 
reference to Acemoglu et al. (2004), determined by the type of political institutions in place in a given 
political system. Thus, by determining the distribution of political power in a society which in turn 
will determine the type of economic institutions in place, political institutions appear to be the 
institutional category at the root of financial development processes. On this point, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) indicate that political institutions constitute the institutional framework constraining 
the political decision-making process. Thus, political institutions ultimately explain the nature of the 
implemented policies and the quality of the legal and institutional system.
4
 In reference to Haber and 
Perotti (2008), two major institutional characteristics allow us to explain the role of political 
institutions in the process of financial development.  
Firstly, the gradual emergence of a limited government which translates in a more important control 
over the actions of political leaders and ultimately results in a better guarantee of property rights and 
implementation of contracts. These factors help to reduce risks associated with investment activities 
and therefore allow a growth of capital accumulation.
5
  
Secondly, the gradual extension of political rights granted to population induces more participation of 
population in political life but also more constraints on choices made by political leaders. This leads to 
the implementation of economic laws promoting better access of populations to financial systems, as 
well as a greater opening of the local market to competition regarding financial activities.
6
  
Consequently, the effects of political institutions on financial development derived mainly from a 
better quality of political governance.  Indeed, by constraining discretion of political power and 
allowing more participation of population in the political decision-making process, democratic 
political institutions induce a limitation of political leader’s authority and a better inclusion of 
                                                          
3 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) consider some economic institutions, such as for the enforcement of property rights, as vertical institutions.  
4 In reference to Acemoglu et al. (2004), when we use the term political institution in our analysis, it refers to the de jure dimension of 
political institutions (the various constitutional rules characterizing a political system). As for the de facto dimension of political institutions, 
the latter is not the subject of our study. On this point, Voghouei et al. (2011b.) show that de jure political institutions are far more important 
than de facto political institutions in order to understand financial development. 
5 This first argument refers to the analyses of North and Weingast (1989) regarding the English Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
6 For example, the United States in the first half of the 19th century and Mexico in the late 1990’s. 
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population preferences. Two features considered in comparative politics as essential in order to 
achieve an efficient decision-making process at the political level from a “decentralist” point of view.7 
Thus, it results from these analyses two levels of understanding of the relationship between political 
institutions and financial development. The first one is the influence of the overall political regimes 
(democracies versus dictatorships) on financial development. Empirical analyses of Girma and 
Shortland (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Huang (2010), Voghouei et al. (2011b) and to a 
lesser extent, Yang (2011), highlight a positive impact of democratic regimes on financial 
development.
 
The second one is the influence of political institutions, i.e. constitutional rules, within 
democratic regimes on financial development. Very few empirical studies have addressed this issue 
(Bordo and Rousseau, 2006; Boudriga and Ghardallou, 2012). As a result, we need to characterized 
the nature of the relationship between democracies and financial development by disaggregating the 
overall effect of democratic regimes on financial development according to its main institutional 
features. In this paper, we carry out this institutional decomposition by focusing on three major 
features of a democratic regime, i.e. forms of government, electoral rules and state forms.   
b. Democratic political institutions and political governance theories:  
In order to articulate the numerous analyses relative to the effects of constitutional rules, we 
distinguish  partisan of separation of political power and partisan of concentration of political power, 
leading to two main paradigms regarding the structuration of political power (Gerring et al., 2009).
8
 
The first one advocates the importance of separation, diffusion and fragmentation of political power. 
The objective of political institutions is to provide a stable environment such as political leader’s 
behaviors can be the most possible predictable (Henisz, 2000, 2004; Stasavage and Keefer, 2003). It is 
a decentralist model of political governance in terms of horizontal separation of power and federalist 
in terms of vertical separation of powers. In this perspective, democratic political institutions 
promoting most separation of political power are presidential form of government, proportional 
electoral rule, federal state form and bicameral legislative structure.
9
 These political institutions induce 
a strong reduction of political leader’s authority and increase inclusion of citizen’s preferences.  
The second one advocates an objective of adaptation of political institutions to population's demands. 
The concentration of political power has an essential role, since flexible government have a strong 
leadership and are able to defeat any significant conflicts of interests (American Political Science 
Association, 1950; Olson, 1982; Gerring et al. 2005, 2007, 2009). It is a centralist model of political 
governance in terms of horizontal separation of powers and unitarist in terms of vertical separation of 
powers.
 10
 Democratic political institutions associated with this model of political governance are 
parliamentary form of government, majoritarian electoral rule, unitary states form and asymmetrical 
bicameral (or unicameral) legislative structure.
11
 These political institutions induce a softer limitation 
of political leader’s authority and decrease inclusion of citizen’s preferences.  
One way to synthetically articulate this trade-off between stability and flexibility in the political 
decision-making process within a given system of political institutions is to refer to the veto players 
theory of Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2002). In connection with the two political governance models 
                                                          
7 See section 1.b. for more details about the decentralist paradigm of political governance. 
8 For a comprehensive literature review about the economic and political effects of democratic political institutions see Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) and Voigt (2011). 
9 This constitutional configuration is also related to the Lijphart’s (2002) consensus model of democracy. It refers for instance to the Swiss 
constitutional arrangement. 
10 Alternatively Gerring et al. (2005) displays a centripetal model of political governance. 
11 This constitutional configuration is also related to the Lijphart’s (2002) majoritarian model of democracy. It refers for instance to the 
Westminster (UK) constitutional arrangement. 
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previously mentioned, the second one will have a relatively limited number of veto players. 
Conversely, a political system favorable to stability at the political decision-making level will have a 
relatively large number of veto players. 
At this point, it is useful to have in mind that resistance to change is one of the explanations of the 
inferiority of the civil law system with respect to the common law, to ensure promotion of financial 
development (LaPorta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003). Therefore, if we apply this theoretical argument 
to political institutions one should expect a positive effect on financial development of political 
institutions related to a limited horizontal and vertical separation of political power. However, 
literature relative to the political economy of finance (Haber and Perotti, 2008) underlines the 
importance of constraints on discretion of political power and greater participation of population in 
political decision-making process in order to promote financial development. In this perspective, one 
should expect a positive effect on financial development of political institutions related to a strong 
horizontal and vertical separation of political power. Thus, it seems a priori difficult to identify what 
specific kinds of constitutional arrangement could promote more financial development. 
Section II: Econometric methodology 
a. Disaggregating the overall effect of democratic regimes on financial development :  
Our goal, in this paper, is to disaggregate the overall effect of democratic regimes on financial 
development so as to identify what precise types of constitutional arrangements within democracies 
account for the observed positive correlation between democratic regimes and financial development 
highlighted for now in the literature (Girma and Shortland, 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Huang, 2010; Voghouei et al., 2011b; Yang, 2011). In order to do this, we rely on a two steps 
analytical process. In a first step, we estimate the effect of democratic regimes on financial 
development using a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the polity2 index of Marshall et al. (2010) 
is at least equal to 1 for each sup-period of three years, 0 otherwise.
12
 Then in a second step, we open 
the institutional black-box associated to democracies by estimating the disaggregated relationship 
between each of the three democratic political institutions considered in this paper (government forms, 
electoral rules and state forms) and financial development. Our institutional dummies take the value 1 
if (i) the country has the considered modality of political institutions in place at time t, and (ii) a 
polity2 index at least equal to 1 at time t, 0 otherwise.  Figure A below summarizes the estimation 
procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 This classification is inspired by Persson and Tabellini (2003), Persson (2005), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Przeworski et al. (2000). 
Although we adopt a relatively restrictive definition of democratic regimes which could lead to overstate the effect of our political 
institutions variables on financial development, our results are robust if instead of using this three years threshold we use the fraction of years 
by three years sub-periods a country is democratic, i.e. 1/3, 2/3 or 3/3 (see Tables c and d in Appendix). 
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Figure A: Political regimes, democratic political institutions and financial development 
 
  
                                                                                             
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After estimating the disaggregated relationship between forms of democracies and financial 
development, we deal with two additional issues related to the effects resulting from the interaction 
between democratic political institutions.  Firstly, as Persson and Tabellini (2003) show, some specific 
types of democratic political institutions are strongly correlated to each other (such as for instance 
presidential government forms and proportional electoral rules in Latin America). Therefore, it turns 
out to be necessary to ensure that the previously identified positive effect on financial development of 
one specific democratic political institution do not come from a systematic association with others one 
also having a strong positive effect on financial development. To this end, we decide to introduce in a 
same econometric specification democratic political institutions variables having the most important 
effect on financial development in term of magnitude relative to the overall effect of democratic 
regimes on financial development. This means that we keep only significant democratic political 
institutions whose estimated coefficients are at least equal to the one associated to democratic 
regimes.
13
 Secondly, we test for interaction effect between forms of democracies by constructing a 
political system variable aiming at assessing the effect on financial development resulting from the 
simultaneous presence in a given democratic system of the most finance enhancing democratic 
political institutions (see section II. c. for more details).  
 
Regarding the choice of our econometric estimator, in order to take into account the impact on national 
banking sector depth of alternative highly inertial democratic political institutions characterized by a 
non-random selection problem, we apply the FEVD estimator (Plümper-Troeger, 2007, 2011). This 
                                                          
13 Political regimes are used as reference to capture the global impact of democracies on financial development compared to autocracies. This 
benchmark variable enables us to capture democratic political institutions having the largest impact on financial depth. So, when we 
implement our econometric analysis, we compare each democratic political institution with the democratic reference, and we keep 
institutions with an estimated coefficient higher than the estimated democratic regime benchmark coefficient. Thereby, we identify 
institutional modalities of a democratic regime which enhance most financial development.    
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commonly used estimator in comparative politics is based on a three-stages procedure, which is a 
fixed-effect vector decomposition (FEVD), dedicated to the estimation of time-invariant and rarely 
changing variables in panel data models with individual fixed effects.
14
 
 
 b. Model specification:  
 
In order to disaggregate the overall effect of democratic regimes on national banking sector depth in a 
context of political institutions variables characterized by a non-random selection pattern and high 
inertia, we estimate the following model on three years periodic panel data of 140 countries over 1984-
2007 using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and the FEVD estimator (Plümper-Troeger, 2007, 
2011). 
1
K
it k kit it t it
k
Y X W v   

                                                                                                          (1) 
 
    is the dependent variable, banking sector depth, a composite index measured by applying a 
principal component analysis to the following three variables: bank assets/GDP, liquid liabilities/GDP 
and private credit/GDP.
15
 It is a commonly used proxy of financial depth in the recent literature and 
this also ensures comparability of our results with Huang (2010) and Voghouei et al. (2011b).
16
   is a 
constant term, ∑     
 
     are alternatives modalities of each form of democracy tested and      is a 
vector of six control variables including traditional determinants of financial development, namely: 
logarithm of GDP per capita, economic growth rate, logarithm of inflation rate and its volatility, a de 
jure measure of financial openness and the logarithm of commercial openness.
17
  i, t and k indicate 
respectively the individual dimension (i = 1, …, 140), the time periodic dimension (t=1, …8) and the 
number of modalities for each democratic political institution tested with   [   ].    refers to time 
dummies in the case of the POLS estimator and temporal trend when using the FEVD estimator, while 
    is a stochastic disturbance term. In addition, the FEVD estimator allows us to introduce in our 
model specification country fixed effects in order to deal with country specific constant source of 
unobservable heterogeneity in our sample. Thus, our econometric specification, by accounting for 
potential sources of both observable and unobservable heterogeneity, enables us to deal with the non-
random selection problem of political institutions in a relevant way.  
 
Finally, three key points are needed to be mentioned. Firstly, we consider political institutions as 
exogenous. This seems to be a reasonable assumption given the relatively limited time horizon of our 
study and the high inertia of political institutions over 1984-2007. Moreover, in this paper we have to 
analyse the effects of ten kinds of political institutions on financial development.
18
 Therefore, if we 
want to make democratic political institutions endogenous and analyzed their effects on financial 
development in a relevant way, we would need two specific instruments for each of these political 
institutions. This is clearly out of reach and is not the purpose of this paper. Moreover, Voigt (2011) 
recall that “endogenous constitutions” is a field of research in its infancy for now.  
 
                                                          
14 See Caldeira (2012), Caldeira et al. (2012) and Heinemann et al. (2014). All details on FEVD estimator are presented in Supplementary 
Materials. We also provide in Supplementary Material an in-depth discussion regarding the choice of a relevant econometric estimator when 
assessing the effects of political institutions variables characterised by high inertia and non-random selection problems.  
15 All this variables come from Cihak et al. (2012). 
16  Table H in Appendix displays an average bilateral correlation of 92% between each sub-component. Our index accounts for 94% of the 
total variance of the three sub-components. The weighting adopted in the principal component analysis is 0.98 (credit/GDP) 0.97 
(liquidities/GDP) and 0.96(bank assets/GDP). 
17 The sources of all these variables are given in the Appendix. 
18 Regime types (democracies vs autocracies), government forms (parliamentary vs semi-presidential vs presidential), electoral rules 
(majoritarian vs mixt vs proportional) and state forms (unitary vs federal). 
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Secondly, given the complexity of the empirical implementation of our study, because of the non-
random and high inertia problems associated to the econometric assessment of the effects of political 
institutions, we limit our econometric analysis to the estimation of the reduced relationship between 
political institutions and financial development. An econometric analysis relative to a structural 
approach of the effects of political institutions on financial development, accounting for potential 
transmission channels governing the relationship between these two variables, is not the aim of this 
paper.  
 
Thirdly, we do not take into account explicitly the notion of de facto political power of Acemoglu et 
al. (2004) in order to remain relatively parsimonious in our econometric specification. On this point, 
Voghouei et al. (2011b) approximate the concept of de facto political power with a Gini coefficient 
capturing income inequality. Here, income inequalities represent a highly inertial feature of countries 
that can be adequately captured by the introduction of country fixed effects in our different models. 
 
Section III: Empirical Evidences 
 
a. Descriptive statistics:  
Preliminary descriptive statistics point out that democratic regimes have a banking sector depth 70% 
higher than autocratic regimes. This result holds if we look in more details at each specific component 
of our aggregate index of financial development with democratic regimes having a private credit/GDP 
ratio two times larger than autocratic regimes, but also bank assets/GDP and liquid liabilities/GDP 
ratio respectively 90% and 43% higher than autocratic regimes.  
 
Table 1: Political regimes, democratic political institutions and financial development 
Variables Financial depth 
Private 
credit/GDP 
Bank assets/GDP 
Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
Political Regimes         
Autocracy -0.47 22.22 28.99 35.99 
Democracy 0.24 45.12 55.22 51.47 
Forms of Democracies         
Government Forms         
Presidential 0.03 35.49 41.44 43.01 
Semi-presidential 0.08 44.18 52.51 44.40 
Parliamentary 0.60 57.66 73.14 63.61 
Electoral Rules         
Majoritarian 0.19 42.01 51.77 51.07 
Mixt 0.39 51.23 63.17 60.23 
Proportional 0.30 47.32 57.74 50.68 
State Forms         
Unitary 0.12 39.95 48.55 47.66 
Federal 0.50 58.00 72.40 60.71 
Constitutional modalities are measured for democratic countries only. 
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If we disaggregate this overall effect of democratic regimes along government forms, electoral rules 
and state forms, we can notice, as we suspected, that the relationship between political regimes and 
financial development is clearly heterogeneous, since parliamentary form of government, complex 
electoral rules (mixt rules and proportional rules) and federal state form are associated to a deeper 
banking sector than democratic regimes taken as a whole. Overall, parliamentary form of government 
seems to be the institutional modality within a democratic regime promoting most financial 
development, following by federal state form and finally by mixt and proportional electoral rules. 
However, because of the non-random selection problem associated to political institutions, these 
preliminary results need to be interpreted with caution. Therefore, in order to have more convincing 
evidences regarding the effect on financial development of democratic regimes and democratic 
political institutions, we need to carry out an econometric analysis accounting for potential sources of 
both observable and unobservable heterogeneity related to our political institutions variables.   
 b. The overall effect of democratic regimes on financial development: 
In the first step of our econometric analysis, we estimate the effect of democratic regimes, relative to 
autocratic regimes, on financial development. Irrespective to the specification estimated, democracies 
foster financial depth. In line with first assessments, table 2 (below) shows that democratic regimes 
improve financial depth by 70% (see column 1), and then by 60% when we use the FEVD estimator 
and introduce our set of control variables (see columns 2-3).  
In accordance with a flourished empirical literature on the relationship between political regimes and 
financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Girma and Shortland, 2008; Huang, 2010; 
Voghouei et al., 2011b; Yang, 2011), we find a significant positive effect of democracies on financial 
development. Recall that compared to autocratic regimes, democracies strengthen the participation of 
citizens in political life and constrain decisions made by political leaders. These characteristics act in 
favor of laws promoting access of people to formal financial systems, and ensure a deeper and sounder 
competition regarding financial activities (Haber and Perotti, 2008). 
As Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Gerring et al. (2005, 2009) show, constitutional arrangements in 
democratic regimes involve different levels of citizen's participation to political life and different 
levels of constraints on the discretion of political power.  This is why, we need to identify what precise 
democratic political institutions within a given democratic system matter most for promoting financial 
development with respect to dictatorships. To do this, the next step of our econometric analysis will 
consist in disaggregating the overall positive effect of democratic regimes on financial development 
along three institutional dimensions namely government forms, electoral rules and state forms so as to 
stress the heterogeneous effects of democracies on financial development, depending on specific 
constitutional arrangements. 
 c. Disaggregating the effect of democratic regimes on financial development:  
In the second step of our econometric analysis, we open the institutional black-box associated to 
democratic regimes and estimate the effects of government forms, electoral rules and state forms on 
financial development. In reference to what we have said in section II.a, we will focus on political 
institutions which have an estimated coefficient statistically higher to the estimated coefficient of the 
democratic regimes benchmark variable. In other words, we focus on democratic political institutions 
which have a stronger impact on financial development than democratic regimes. 
Regarding firstly government forms, parliamentary system has an estimated coefficient statistically 
higher to the estimated coefficient of the democratic regimes benchmark variable. Indeed, 
12 
 
parliamentary system expands by 86% to 107% banking sector depth compared to autocratic regimes 
and by 30 to 39% relative to the overall effect of democracies (see columns 4-6). In reference to 
theories of political governance, parliamentary system is a flexible government form which induces a 
strong leadership and which is able to defeat any significant conflicts of interests in the political 
decision-making process (Gerring et al. 2005, 2009). Therefore, parliamentary system is effective to 
boost financial development due to its adaptation capacity, since it has less veto players than other 
government forms (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999, 2002). Moreover, parliamentary system promotes a deeper 
and sounder competition of financial activities due to a stronger political governance and limitation of 
lobby’s potency (Gerring et al., 2009).  
As for electoral rules, complex electoral systems (mixt rules and proportional rules) have an estimated 
coefficient statistically higher to the estimated coefficient of the democratic regimes benchmark 
variable.  However, these results are not robust when we add our set of controls variables (see columns 
7-9). Thus, contrary to Bordo and Rousseau (2006), we do not find that electoral rules are a crucial 
constitutional component to explain the heterogeneous effect of democratic regimes on financial 
development. Indeed, we presume that voting procedures in place in a given democratic system are 
useful to understand the nature of pork barrel in place (Persico and Lizzeri, 2001; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003) rather than financial depth induced by constitutional arrangements.  
Concerning state forms, federal state form has an estimated coefficient statistically higher to the 
estimated coefficient of the democratic regimes benchmark variable. Federal state form fosters 
financial depth by 87% to 99% compared to autocracies and by 29% to 33% relative to the overall 
effect of democratic regimes (see columns 10-12). If we refer once again to theories of political 
governance, federal state form induces a strong vertical separation of power and involves a broad 
inclusion of people's preferences at local level (Gerring et al., 2005). A strong vertical separation of 
power is favorable to a deeper and sounder competition of financial sector through foot voting effect 
(Tiebout, 1956; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Ribstein and Kobayashi, 2006) and through laboratory 
effect (Hayek, 1939; Oates, 1999). In our case, the foot voting effect reflects citizen’s and 
entrepreneur’s capacity to introduce competition between local banks and thus encouraging local 
banks to adopt attracting policies, whereas the laboratory effect reflects disclosure and dissemination 
of the most efficient methods regarding the ways of conducting financial activities between local 
jurisdictions.  
Our empirical results provide strong evidences of an heterogeneous effect of democratic regimes on 
financial development relative to autocratic regimes. Indeed, parliamentary system and federal state 
form represent two constitutional arrangements particularly effective in boosting financial sector 
depth. Moreover, these results exceed traditional theories of political governance since the promotion 
of financial development is related to a political system inducing a flexible horizontal separation of 
power and a strong vertical separation of power. In other words, financial development is all the more 
important in a given democratic system if the Executive face low constraints in the political decision-
making process (horizontal dimension of political power) and if there is a broad inclusion of people's 
preferences at local level (vertical dimension of political power). Empirically, this political system 
reflects for instance the constitutional configuration of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, 
Pakistan and Spain.  
d. Competing forms of democraties, political systems and financial development:  
In the final step of our econometric analysis, we characterize the effect on financial development 
resulting from the interaction between parliamentary system and federal state form. In other word, we 
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are testing the interaction effect between the two constitutional arrangements which have a stronger 
effect on banking sector depth than the overall effect democratic regimes. In Table 3, we adopt two 
strategies to take into account these interactions. 
On the one hand, we test a “synergistic effect” between parliamentary system and federal state form. 
To this end, we create an ordered variable equal to 0 if country is a dictatorship, equal to 1 if country is 
a democracy, equal to 2 if country is a democracy with a parliamentary government form or federal 
state form, and equal to 3 if combining the two. Opting for an ordered variable is necessary, (i) since 
we do not have enough observations to precisely estimate standard errors associated with a binary 
variable of such a political system; and (ii) to have more detailed information on complementarities 
between democratic political institutions. On the other hand, we introduce, in a same econometric 
specification, parliamentary system and federal state form to check if the positive effect of one just 
comes from a systematic association with the other.  
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Table 2: Forms of Democracies and Financial Development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
ols pt Pt ols pt pt ols pt pt ols pt pt 
VARIABLES fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
                          
democracy 0.701*** 0.596*** 0.633*** 
   
  
  
  
    [0.144] [0.122] [0.201]                   
presidentialism 
 
  0.491*** 0.361 0.369   
  
  
  
   
  [0.179] [0.268] [0.294]   
  
  
  semi_pres 
  
  0.521** 0.362 0.321   
  
  
  
   
  [0.241] [0.309] [0.351]   
  
  
  parliamentarism 
 
  1.070*** 0.979*** 0.864**   
  
  
          [0.170] [0.233] [0.393]             
majoritarian 
  
  
   
0.632*** 0.487*** 0.512**   
  
   
  
   
[0.182] [0.185] [0.220]   
  mixt 
  
  
   
0.818*** 0.629*** 0.610**   
  
   
  
   
[0.239] [0.215] [0.249]   
  proportional 
  
  
   
0.731*** 0.615*** 0.521   
                [0.168] [0.225] [0.353]       
unitarism 
  
  
   
  
  
0.615*** 0.522*** 0.550*** 
   
  
   
  
  
[0.146] [0.129] [0.191] 
federalism 
  
  
   
  
  
0.987*** 0.866** 0.948* 
   
  
   
  
  
[0.211] [0.384] [0.514] 
   
  
   
  
  
  
  Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Democracy 
  
  0.701*** 0.596*** 0.633*** 0.701*** 0.596*** 0.633*** 0.701*** 0.596*** 0.633*** 
  
  [0.144] [0.122] [0.201] [0.144] [0.122] [0.201] [0.144] [0.122] [0.201] 
Observations 894 688 606 817 621 543 818 622 544 894 688 606 
R-squared 0.124 0.674 0.738 0.206 0.680 0.762 0.143 0.677 0.762 0.140 0.676 0.739 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Estimated coefficients in red are significantly higher to the democratic regime benchmark. Estimated coefficients in blue are significantly lower to the 
democratic regime benchmark. Time dummies or time trends are included for each regression. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Complementarity and Competition Between Forms of Democraties 
  Synergisitic effect Competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ols pt pt ols pt pt 
VARIABLES fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
              
synergy 0.450*** 0.402*** 0.364** 
     [0.0717] [0.0963] [0.162]       
parliamentarism 
 
  0.781*** 0.754*** 0.635* 
   
  [0.142] [0.254] [0.369] 
federalism 
  
  0.408** 0.333 0.303 
   
  [0.197] [0.419] [0.512] 
            
 Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 817 621 543 817 621 543 
R-squared 0.207 0.681 0.763 0.178 0.681 0.763 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Time dummies or time trends are included for each regression. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regarding the "synergistic effect", we provide evidences that the interaction between parliamentary 
system and federal state form improves financial depth by 154% to 205% relative to autocracies, but 
also by 86% to 110% relative to democracies associated with other constitutional arrangements, and 
by 36% to 45% compared to parliamentary non-federal systems or federal non-parliamentary states 
(see columns 1-3).
19
 Again, these results stress the important ability of a flexible federalism to promote 
financial activities, through more adaptation capacities (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999, 2002), stronger political 
governance, the limitation of lobby’s potency (Gerring et al., 2005, 2009) and a broad inclusion of 
people's preferences at local level (Gerring et al., 2005). 
Moreover, when we test for competition between our two constitutional arrangements, parliamentary 
system has systematically an estimated coefficient statistically higher to the estimated coefficient of 
federal state form (see columns 4-6). Furthermore, federal state form does not survive to the 
competition, when we introduce specific effects (column 5) and when we add our set of control 
variables (column 6).
20
  This means that political institutions seems to boost financial development 
process mainly through the top-down effect of parliamentary system, which ensures low constraints on 
the political decision-making process (Gerring et al., 2005, 2009)  rather through the bottom-up effect 
of federal state form,  which ensures a broad inclusion of citizen's preferences at local level (Gerring et 
al., 2005). 
To summarize, in line with the empirical literature on the relationship between political regimes and 
financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Girma and Shortland, 2008; Huang, 2010; 
Voghouei et al., 2011b; Yang, 2011), our results displays a positive and significant impact of 
democratic regimes on financial development. Furthermore, the effect of democracies on financial 
development is highly heterogeneous and depends on very specific kinds of democratic political 
institutions. Indeed, parliamentary system seems to foster financial development through low 
constrains on the political decision-making process (Gerring et al., 2005, 2009), while federal state 
                                                          
19 For example in column 3, the estimated coefficient of the synergy ordered variable is 0.364. In other words, when synergy is equal to 1 
there is an improvement of   36.4% of financial depth. When synergy is equal to 2 there is an improvement of (1.364)*0.364=86.05% of 
financial depth. Finally, when synergy is equal to there is an improvement (1.8605)*0.364=153,77% of financial depth. 
20 Our results are qualitatively similar when we introduce proportional or mixt electoral systems. Proportional electoral rules (or mixt 
electoral rules) estimated coefficients are never significant when they are introduced with parliamentary system and federal state form.  
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form is favorable to a deeper and sounder competition of financial sector  through a broad inclusion of 
people's preference at local level (see table 4, below). Moreover, we provide evidence of an interaction 
effect between parliamentary system and federal state form on financial development. Furthermore, 
parliamentary system seems to be the key constitutional arrangement to ensure a deeper and sounder 
competition in financial activities.  
Our results are robust to (i) dependent variable specification, (ii) interest variable specification, (iii) 
outliers, and (iv) test for simultaneous relationship between financial development and political 
institutions. All this robustness checks are presented in the appendix of this article. 
Table 4:  Constitutional Arrangements promoting most financial development 
Section IV:  Conclusion  
In this article, we show that although democratic regimes appear to significantly and positively 
promote financial development, the simple opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not 
sufficient to account for differentials in financial development between countries from a political point 
of view. Indeed, by disaggregating the overall effect of democracies on financial development, our 
econometric results highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic 
regimes and financial development. Therefore, the positive effect induces by democracies on financial 
development is explained by the presence of very specific democratic political institutions, namely: 
parliamentary form of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. In reference to political 
governance theories, these democratic political institutions characterize a complementary relationship 
between a low horizontal separation of powers (centralist paradigm) and a strong vertical separation of 
powers (federalist paradigm). Thus, the promotion of financial development seems to be all the more 
important that political institutions associated with democratic regimes allow horizontal flexibility and 
vertical stability in the political decision-making process. Therefore, in terms of development policies 
implications, this article stresses the fact that advocating the implementation of democratic regimes in 
developing countries in order to promote economic and financial development is not enough. 
Policymakers must have to remind that constitutional modalities may have a fundamental importance 
to achieve macroeconomic objectives and promote well-being, through an improved efficiency in the 
political decision-making process. Recall that the promotion of a developed banking sector is a 
precondition for sustainable economic growth but also for inequality and poverty reduction. 
As a result, it turns out to be necessary to deepen the study of the institutional determinants of 
financial development in light of the analyses carried out in constitutional economics and comparative 
 
 
State Forms 
(I) Unitary States (II) Federal States 
F
o
rm
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f 
G
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n
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en
ts
 
(A1)Presidentialism 
(A1) Strong or (A2) moderate constraints 
on the political decision making process  
 
(I) Weak inclusion of people's preference 
at local level 
(A1) Strong or (A2) moderate constraints 
on the political decision making process  
 
 (II) Broad inclusion of people's preference 
at local level 
(A2)Semi-
Presidentialism 
(B)Parliamentarism 
(B) Low constraints on the political 
decision making process 
 
(B) Low constraints on the political 
decision making process 
 
(I) Weak inclusion of people's preference 
at local level 
(II) Broad inclusion of people's preference 
at local level 
Note: In red, constitutional characteristics which are boosting financial activities. 
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politics. This is precisely the objective of this article although many potential developments are 
possible in order to ensure the validity of our results. On this point, our article could be subject to 
several potential developments. Firstly, it would be interesting to envision the study of the precise 
political institutions explaining differentials in financial development between democratic regimes 
only. On this point, it would be relevant to introduce of new set of political institutions such as direct 
democracy and procedural rules. Secondly, given the multidimensional nature of financial 
development, it would be essential to extend our study to the analysis of the relationship between 
forms of democracies and the depth of financial markets, and also to the access, efficiency and 
stability of financial systems. Thirdly, it seems important to consider an econometric modeling that 
allow us to estimate more accurately the structural relationship between forms of democracies and 
financial development so as to characterize as precisely as possible all the transmission channels 
governing the relationship between these two variables.  
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Appendix 
List of variables  
Financial development: financial depth index based on principal components extracted from private 
credit/GDP, bank assets/GDP and liquid liabilities/GDP, based on Global Financial Development 
Database (Cihak et al., 2012). 
Political regimes: dummy variable =1 if polity2 index >0, =0 otherwise, author’s construction based 
on Polity IV database from Marshall and Jaggers, 2010. 
Governement forms: dummy variables =1 if Presidential/Semi-Presidential/Parliamentary forms of 
governments & polity2 index >0, =0 otherwise, author’s construction based on Cheibub et al., 2009. 
Electoral rules: dummy variables =1 if Majoritarian/Mixt/Proportional electoral rules & polity2 index 
>0, =0 otherwise, author’s construction based on Bormann and Golder, 2013. 
State forms : dummy variables =1 if Unitary/Federal state & polity2 index >0, =0 otherwise, author’s 
construction based on CIA The World Factbook, 2013 & Perspective Monde from Sherbrook 
University. 
Synergy: ordered variable equals to 0 if country is an autocracy, equals to 1 if country is a democracy, 
equals to 2 if country is a democracy with a parliamentary government form or federal state form, and 
equals to 3 if combining the two, author’s construction. 
Log GDP per capita: logarithm of GDP per capita, at 2005 US$, based on World Development 
Indicators, 2013. 
Economic growth rate: growth of GDP per capita, author’s construction, based on World 
Development Indicators, 2013. 
Log (1 + inflation): logarithm of 1 + annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index, author’s 
construction, based on World Development Indicators, 2013. 
Log trade openness: logarithm of openness at 2005 constant price (%), based on Penn World Table 
7.1, 2013. 
Financial Openness: KOAPEN index based on principal components extracted from disaggregated 
capital and current account restriction from Chinn and Ito (2006). 
Inflation volatility: standard deviations of Log (1 + inflation) variable by three years sub periods, 
author’s construction, based on World Development Indicators, 2013. 
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Table A: Political repartition of the 140 countries belonging to our sample 
Permanent Permanent Political 
Dictatorships Democracies Transitions 
37 countries 48 countries 55 countries 
 Afghanistan Argentina Albania 
 Angola  Australia   Burundi 
 United Arab Emirates  Austria  Benin 
Burkina Faso  Belgium  Bangladesh 
 Bahrain  Bolivia  Bulgaria  
Bhutan Botswana  Brazil 
 China   Canada   Central African Republic 
 Cote d'Ivoire  Switzerland   Chile 
Cameroon   Colombia  Congo Brazzaville  
 Cuba  Costa Rica    Comoros  
 Egypt  Cyprus   Djibouti 
 Gabon Czech Republic  Algeria 
Guinea  Germany  Ethiopia  
 Equatorial Guinea   Denmark   Fiji 
Iraq   Dominican Republic Ghana  
 Jordan   Ecuador  Gambia 
 Kuwait  Spain  Guinea Bissau 
Laos  Estonia Guatemala 
Libya Finland  Guyana 
 Morocco France  Croatia  
Mauritania United Kingdom   Haiti  
 Oman  Greece   Hungary 
 Qatar Honduras  Indonesia 
 Rwanda  India  Iran 
Saudi Arabia Ireland   Kenya 
 Sudan  Israel  Cambodia 
 Singapore  Italy  Korea South 
 Somalia  Jamaica   Lebanon 
Swaziland Japan  Liberia 
 Syria Sri Lanka  Lesotho 
 Chad  Moldova  Madagascar  
 Togo Macedonia  Mexico 
Tunisia  Mauritius  Mali  
 Tanzania  Malaysia  Mongolia 
 Uganda Netherlands Mozambique 
Vietnam  Norway   Malawi 
 Yemen New Zealand  Niger 
  Papua New Guinea  Nigeria 
  Portugal  Nicaragua 
   Russia  Nepal 
   El Salvador Pakistan 
   Slovenia   Panama  
  Sweden Peru 
   Trinidad   Philippines 
   Turkey Poland 
   United States  Paraguay 
   Venezuela  Romania 
   South Africa Senegal 
    Solomon Islands 
    Sierra Leone  
     Thailand 
     Uruguay 
    Congo Kinshasa  
   
    Zambia  
     Zimbabwe  
 
24 
 
Table B: Constitutional arrangements in the 48 permanent democracies in our sample 
Country  Gvt form Electoral rule State form Const reforms 
Argentina  Pres Prop Fed   
Australia Parl Maj Fed   
Austria Semi pres Prop Fed   
Belgium Parl Prop Fed   
Bolivia Pres Prop Uni 1984-1996 
  Pres Mixt Uni 1997-2007 
Botswana N-A N-A Uni   
Canada Parl Maj Fed   
Switzerland Pres Prop Fed   
Colombia Pres Prop Uni   
Costa-Rica Pres Prop Uni   
Cyprus Pres Prop Uni   
Czech Rep (obs : 1993-2007) Parl Prop Uni   
Germany Parl Mixt Fed   
Denmark Parl Prop Uni   
Dominican Rep Pres Prop Uni   
Ecuador Pres Prop Uni 1984-1997 
  Pres Mixt Uni 1998-2001 
  Pres Prop Uni 2002-2007 
Spain Parl Prop Fed   
Estonia (obs : 1991-2007) Parl Prop Uni   
Finland Semi pres Prop Uni   
France Semi pres Maj Uni 1984-1985 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1986-1987 
  Semi pres Maj Uni 1988-2007 
United Kingdom Parl Maj Uni   
Greece Parl Prop Uni   
Honduras Pres Prop Uni   
India Parl Maj Fed   
Ireland Semi pres Prop Uni   
Israel Parl Prop Uni   
Italy Parl Prop Uni 1984-1993 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1994-2005 
  Parl Prop Uni 2006-2007 
Jamaica Parl Maj Uni   
Japan Parl Maj Uni 1984-1995 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1996-2007 
Sri Lanka Pres Maj Uni 1984-1988 
  Pres Prop Uni 1989-2007 
Moldova (obs : 1991-2007) Parl Prop Uni 1991-1996 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1997-1999 
  Parl Prop Uni 2000-2007 
Macedonia (obs : 1991-2007) Semi pres Maj Uni 1991-1997 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1998-2007 
Mauritius Parl Maj Uni   
Malaysia N-A N-A Fed   
Netherlands Parl Prop Uni   
Norway Parl Prop Uni   
New Zealand Parl Maj Uni 1984-1995 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1996-2007 
Papua New Guinea Parl Maj Uni   
Portugal Semi pres Prop Uni   
Russia (obs : 1992-2007) N-A N-A Fed   
El Salvador Pres Prop Uni   
Slovenia (obs : 1991-2007) Semi pres Prop Uni 1991-2002 
  Parl Prop Uni 2003-2007 
Sweden Parl Prop Uni   
Trinidad and Tobago Parl Maj Uni   
Turquey Parl Prop Uni 1984-1986 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1987-1994 
  Parl Prop Uni 1995-2007 
United States Pres Maj Fed   
Venezuela Pres Prop Fed 1984-1992 
  Pres Mixt Fed 1993-2007 
South Africa N-A N-A Fed   
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Table C: Constitutional arrangements in the 55 countries with political transitions in our sample 
Country  Gvt form Electoral rule State form Democratic periods 
Albania Parl Mixt Uni 1990-1995 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1997-2007 
Burundi Pres Prop Uni 2002-2007 
Benin Pres Prop Uni 1991-2007 
Bangladesh Parl Maj Uni 1991-2006 
Bulgaria Semi pres Prop Uni 1990-2007 
Brazil Pres Prop Fed 1985-2007 
Central Africa Rep Semi pres Maj Uni 1993-2002 
Chile Pres Prop Uni 1989-2007 
Congo Brazzaville Semi pres Maj Uni 1992-1996 
Comoros Semi pres Maj Fed 1990-1994 
  N-A Maj Fed 1996-1998 
  Pres Maj Fed 2002-2007 
Djibouti N-A N-A Uni 1999-2007 
Algeria N-A N-A Uni 2004-2007 
Ethiopia N-A N-A Fed 1993-2007 
Fiji N-A N-A Uni 1984-1986 
  Parl Maj Uni 1990-2005 
Ghana Pres Maj Uni 1996-2007 
Gambia N-A N-A Uni 1984-1993 
Guinea Bissau N-A N-A Uni 1994-1997 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1999-2002 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 2005-2007 
Guatemala Pres Prop Uni 1986-2007 
Guyana N-A N-A Uni 1992-2007 
Croatia Semi pres Mixt Uni 1999 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 2000-2007 
Haiti N-A N-A Uni 1990 
  N-A N-A Uni 1994-1999 
  N-A N-A Uni 2005-2007 
Hungary Parl Mixt Uni 1989-2007 
Indonesia Pres Prop Uni 1999-2007 
Iran N-A N-A Uni 1997-2003 
Kenya Pres Maj Uni 2002-2007 
Cambodia N-A N-A Uni 1990-1996 
  N-A N-A Uni 1998-2007 
Korea South Pres Mixt Uni 1987-2007 
Lebanon (obs : 1984-1989; 2005-2007) N-A N-A Uni 2005-2007 
Liberia Pres Maj Uni 2003-2007 
Lesotho N-A N-A Uni 1993-2007 
  N-A N-A Uni 1999-2007 
Madagascar Semi pres Prop Uni 1991-1997 
  Semi pres Mixt Uni 1998-2006 
  Semi pres Maj Uni 2007 
Mexico Pres Mixt Fed 1994-2007 
Mali Semi pres Maj Uni 1992-2007 
Mongolia Parl Maj Uni 1990-1991 
  Semi pres Maj Uni 1992-2007 
Mozambique N-A N-A Uni 1994-2007 
Malawi Pres Maj Uni 1994-2007 
Niger Semi pres Mixt Uni 1991-1995 
  Semi pres Mixt Uni 1999-2007 
Nigeria Pres Maj Fed 1999-2007 
Nicaragua Pres Prop Uni 1990-2007 
Nepal Parl Maj Uni 1990-2001 
  N-A Maj Uni 2006-2007 
Pakistan Parl Maj Fed 1988-1998 
  N-A Maj Fed 2007 
Panama Pres Mixt Uni 1989-2007 
Peru Pres Prop Uni 1984-1991 
  Pres Prop Uni 1993-2007 
Philipines Pres Maj Uni 1986-1997 
  Pres Mixt Uni 1998-2007 
Poland Semi pres Prop Uni 1989-2007 
Paraguay Pres Mixt Uni 1989-1992 
  Pres Prop Uni 1993-2007 
Romania Semi pres Prop Uni 1990-2007 
Senegal Semi pres Mixt Uni 2000-2007 
Solomon Islands Parl Maj Uni 1984-1999 
  Parl Maj Uni 2004-2007 
Sierra Leone Pres Prop Uni 1996 
  Pres Prop Uni 2001 
  Pres Maj Uni 2002-2007 
Thailand Parl Maj Uni 1984-1990 
  Parl Maj Uni 1992-2000 
  Parl Mixt Uni 2001-2005 
Uruguay Pres Prop Uni 1985-2007 
Congo Kinshasa N-A N-A Uni 2003-2007 
Zambia N-A N-A Uni 1991-2007 
Zimbabwe N-A N-A Uni 1984-1986 
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Table D: Within and between variability of political institutions variables 
  Democracy Presidential 
Semi-
presidential Parliamentary Majoritarian Mixt Proportional Federal  Unitary 
Within Std. Dev. 0.28 0.17 0 .15 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.10 0.26 
Between Std. 
Dev. 0.42 0.35 0 .26 0.39 0.29 0.19 0.41 0.32 0.42 
 
Table E: Mapping of Political Institutions 
Variables Demo Pres Semi-pres Parl Maj Mixt Prop Uni Fed 
Regions                   
World 0.58 0.38 0.19 0.43 0.30 0.15 0.55 0.78 0.22 
East Asia & Pacific 0.66 0.23 0.07 0.70 0.69 0.27 0.04 0.82 0.18 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.86 0.00 0.52 0.48 0.04 0.20 0.76 0.93 0.07 
Latin America 0.85 0.89 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.74 0.81 0.19 
Middle-East & North Africa 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 1.00 0.00 
North America 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
South Asia 0.58 0.27 0.00 0.73 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.61 0.39 
Sub-saharan Africa 0.33 0.44 0.42 0.14 0.64 0.17 0.19 0.81 0.19 
Western Europe 1.00 0.12 0.29 0.59 0.11 0.09 0.80 0.71 0.29 
Income                   
Low-income 0.36 0.40 0.29 0.31 0.59 0.10 0.31 0.83 0.17 
Lower-middle income 0.61 0.62 0.13 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.62 0.92 0.08 
Higher-middle incom 0.69 0.53 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.30 0.55 0.70 0.30 
High-income non OECD 0.41 0.36 0.20 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
High-income OECD 1.00 0.09 0.24 0.67 0.28 0.12 0.60 0.62 0.38 
Period                   
1984-1986 0.39 0.37 0.11 0.52 0.34 0.02 0.64 0.72 0.28 
1987-1989 0.41 0.39 0.10 0.51 0.35 0.06 0.59 0.70 0.30 
1990-1992 0.54 0.35 0.19 0.46 0.32 0.12 0.56 0.79 0.21 
1993-1995 0.61 0.34 0.23 0.43 0.35 0.12 0.53 0.78 0.22 
1996-1998 0.62 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.31 0.16 0.53 0.78 0.22 
1999-2001 0.65 0.38 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.22 0.53 0.80 0.20 
2002-2004 0.68 0.43 0.19 0.38 0.27 0.20 0.53 0.79 0.21 
2005-2007 0.69 0.43 0.20 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.54 0.80 0.20 
Colonial Origin                   
Spain 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.83 0.17 
English 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.61 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.78 0.22 
French 0.23 0.24 0.76 0.00 0.42 0.32 0.25 0.88 0.12 
Portuguese 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.47 
Legal Origin                   
English 0.59 0.27 0.05 0.68 0.77 0.03 0.20 0.72 0.28 
German 0.98 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.49 0.41 0.38 0.62 
French 0.52 0.61 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.70 0.80 0.20 
Socialist 0.55 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.60 1.00 0.00 
First column: % of democratic observation on global sample. Other columns: constitutional modalities are measured for democratic countries sample, 
only. 
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Table F: Mapping of Financial Development  
Variables Financial_depth 
Private 
credit/GDP 
Bank assets/GDP 
Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
Regions         
World -0.02 36.60 45.49 45.69 
East Asia & Pacific 0.46 58.14 69.27 67.26 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
-0.01 25.52 36.78 36.83 
Latin America -0.06 26.78 32.63 33.91 
Middle-East & North Africa 0.38 35.66 51.71 60.88 
North America 0.91 68.83 77.41 77.48 
South Asia -0.09 20.36 28.56 39.88 
Sub-saharan Africa -0.87 13.10 16.94 23.26 
Western Europe 1.03 84.70 101.01 80.86 
Income         
Low-income -0.75 14.66 19.02 26.17 
Lower-middle income 0.02 29.08 37.53 43.26 
Higher-middle incom 0.16 35.23 43.88 44.23 
High-income non OECD 1.09 75.34 95.84 99.98 
High-income OECD 1.02 83.87 100.40 81.17 
Period         
1984-1986 -0.10 31.64 40.49 42.45 
1987-1989 -0.08 33.57 42.23 43.00 
1990-1992 -0.14 32.79 40.72 42.13 
1993-1995 -0.11 33.79 43.26 42.69 
1996-1998 -0.07 35.80 45.18 44.12 
1999-2001 0.02 38.77 47.53 47.39 
2002-2004 0.06 39.62 49.05 49.34 
2005-2007 0.15 43.95 52.40 51.55 
Constitutional modalities are measured for democratic countries only. 
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Table G: Mapping of Controls 
Variables GDP/cap Growth Trade openness 
Financial 
openness 
Inflation 
Economic 
volatility 
Regions             
World 5800.76 1.81 68.68 0.10 45.31 48.90 
East Asia & Pacific 6688.58 3.34 87.81 0.33 7.43 4.59 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 3346.88 1.68 75.67 -0.09 59.23 55.46 
Latin America 3012.93 1.59 61.30 0.26 112.72 128.81 
Middle-East & North Africa 7650.35 1.50 85.41 0.43 16.13 6.67 
North America 26387.97 2.05 40.61 2.46 2.93 0.67 
South Asia 468.09 3.73 45.34 -1.09 7.89 2.61 
Sub-saharan Africa 725.45 1.04 61.69 -0.70 69.56 74.85 
Western Europe 20737.14 2.19 68.13 1.60 3.63 0.96 
Income             
Low-income 418.41 1.31 56.19 -0.74 60.08 63.16 
Lower-middle income 1762.83 1.94 76.38 -0.29 55.38 62.47 
Higher-middle incom 5527.38 2.50 79.71 0.53 63.07 58.75 
High-income non OECD 20188.92 1.86 123.75 1.43 9.75 5.41 
High-income OECD 21987.46 2.10 59.35 1.87 3.48 1.00 
Political Regimes             
Autocracy 2784.41 1.29 69.05 -0.41 65.07 71.08 
Democracy 8153.14 2.19 68.53 0.50 34.31 32.65 
Forms of Democracies             
Government Forms             
Presidential 5317.79 2.08 60.36 0.19 90.05 102.98 
Semi-presidential 7967.50 1.62 69.16 0.38 20.81 17.51 
Parliamentary 12508.53 2.41 69.20 0.90 9.32 3.34 
Electoral Rules             
Majoritarian 7594.81 2.16 64.16 0.40 9.26 4.82 
Mixt 8465.08 1.99 64.91 0.83 8.53 3.84 
Proportional 9608.91 2.12 67.12 0.51 68.39 75.22 
State Forms             
Unitary 6604.77 2.17 71.17 0.38 33.17 34.22 
Federal 11952.84 2.02 54.83 0.63 58.78 55.52 
Constitutional modalities are measured for democratic countries only. 
 
Table H: Bilateral correlation relationship between the most finance enhancing democratic 
political institutions 
  Parliamentary Mixt Federal 
Parliamentary 1.0000 
 
  
Mixt  0.1615*** 1.0000   
Federal  0.2095*** 0.1166***  1.0000  
*** p<0.01 
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Table I: Bilateral correlation between measures of banking sector depth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Financial depth 
Private 
credit/GDP Bank assets/GDP Liquid Liabilities 
Financial depth 1.0000  
  
  
 
Private 
credit/GDP 0.7871*** 1.0000  
 
  
 
Bank assets/GDP 0.8081*** 0.9713*** 1.0000    
Liquid Liabilities 0.7915*** 0.8698*** 0.9056***    1.0000 
*** p<0.01 
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Robustness checks 
Alternative Measure of Financial Development 
Table a: Financial Development and Forms of Democracy (Financial depth: PCA of credit/GDP;M3/GDP; bank asset/central 
bank asset) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
ols pt pt ols pt pt ols pt pt ols pt pt 
VARIABLES fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
                          
democracy 0.783*** 0.704*** 0.777*** 
  
  
  
  
     [0.142] [0.128] [0.268]                   
presidentialism 
 
  0.574*** 0.493** 0.504* 
  
  
   
   
  [0.171] [0.241] [0.288] 
  
  
   semi_pres 
  
  0.572** 0.416 0.404 
  
  
   
   
  [0.224] [0.298] [0.357] 
  
  
   parliamentarism 
 
  1.133*** 1.098*** 1.075*** 
  
  
           [0.167] [0.219] [0.412]             
majoritarian 
  
  
  
  0.711*** 0.607*** 0.645*** 
   
   
  
  
  [0.173] [0.191] [0.246] 
   mixt 
  
  
  
  0.908*** 0.781*** 0.779*** 
   
   
  
  
  [0.230] [0.217] [0.275] 
   proportional 
  
  
  
  0.780*** 0.698*** 0.659* 
                 [0.166] [0.211] [0.368]       
unitarism 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.694*** 0.621*** 0.682*** 
   
  
  
  
  
  [0.143] [0.133] [0.245] 
federalism 
  
  
  
  
  
  1.074*** 0.994*** 1.147** 
   
  
  
  
  
  [0.205] [0.340] [0.550] 
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
Controls 
Observations 
No 
832 
No 
613 
Yes 
543 
No 
761 
No 
553 
Yes 
487 
No 
762 
No 
554 
Yes 
488 
No 
832 
No 
613 
Yes 
543 
R-squared 0.156 0.785 0.821 0.234 0.792 0.829 0.169 0.792 0.831 0.173 0.787 0.824 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Estimated coefficients in red are significantly higher to the democratic regime benchmark. Estimated coefficients in 
blue are significantly lower to the democratic regime benchmark. Time dummies or time trends are included for each regression. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table b: Complementarity and Competition (Financial depth: PCA 
of credit/GDP;M3/GDP; bank asset/central bank asset) 
  Synergisitic effect Competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ols pt pt ols pt pt 
VARIABLES fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
              
synergy 0.479*** 0.455*** 0.450** 
     [0.0700] [0.0936] [0.176]       
parliamentarism 
 
  0.793*** 0.791*** 0.745** 
   
  [0.140] [0.237] [0.371] 
federalism 
  
  0.442** 0.398 0.385 
   
  [0.192] [0.384] [0.481] 
         
 Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 761 553 487 761 553 487 
R-squared 0.237 0.795 0.833 0.200 0.793 0.832 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Time dummies or time trends are included 
for each regression.. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Alternative Measures of Political Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Table c:  Financial Development and Forms of Democracy ( Institution variables equaling 0.33, 0.67 and 1, if country is 
democratic respectively one year, two years or three years, for each period of three years ) 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   
  ols1 pt2 pt3 ols4 pt5 pt6 ols7 pt8 pt9 
VARIABLES 
  
  fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
                          
democracy 0.698*** 0.611*** 0.655** 
  
  
  
  
     [0.158] [0.160] [0.276]                   
presidentialism 
 
  0.489** 0.375 0.391 
  
  
   
   
  [0.188] [0.318] [0.377] 
  
  
   
semi_pres 
  
  0.502** 0.351 0.310 
  
  
   
   
  [0.250] [0.345] [0.411] 
  
  
   
parliamentarism 
 
  1.076*** 1.016*** 0.902* 
  
  
   
        [0.180] [0.297] [0.501]             
majoritarian 
  
  
  
  0.677*** 0.571** 0.603** 
   
   
  
  
  [0.197] [0.235] [0.304] 
   
mixt 
  
  
  
  0.869*** 0.703** 0.666 
   
   
  
  
  [0.249] [0.316] [0.422] 
   
proportional 
  
  
  
  0.775*** 0.684** 0.579 
   
              [0.181] [0.306] [0.500]       
unitarism 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.608*** 0.528*** 0.566** 
   
  
  
  
  
  [0.160] [0.174] [0.265] 
federalism 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.991*** 0.905** 1.007* 
   
  
  
  
  
  [0.218] [0.395] [0.568] 
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 894 688 606 817 621 543 818 622 544 894 688 606 
R-squared 0.114 0.675 0.738 0.202 0.681 0.764 0.150 0.679 0.762 0.131 0.679 0.740 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Estimated coefficients in red are significantly higher to the democratic regime benchmark. Estimated 
coefficients in blue are significantly lower to the democratic regime benchmark. Time dummies or time trends are included for each regression. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table d: Complementarity and Competition (Institution variables 
equaling 0.33, 0.67 and 1, if country is democratic respectively one 
year, two years or three years, for each period of three years) 
  Synergisitic effect Competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ols pt pt ols pt pt 
VARIABLES fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
              
synergy 0.450*** 0.402*** 0.364** 
     [0.0717] [0.0963] [0.162]       
parliamentarism 
 
  0.779*** 0.773** 0. 653 
   
  [0.145] [0.323] [0.460] 
federalism 
  
  0.400** 0.358 0.341 
   
  [0.194] [0.437] [0.547] 
         
 Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 817 621 543 817 621 543 
R-squared 0.207 0.681 0.763 0.180 0.681 0.762 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Time dummies or time trends are included 
for each regression. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Accounting for Outliers with Robust Regressions 
Table e: Financial Development and Forms of Democracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
wls wls wls wls wls wls 
VARIABLES fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth fi_depth 
 
            
democracy 0.178*** 
  
    
 
  [0.0438]           
presidentialism   0.143***         
  
[0.0537] 
 
    
 
semi_pres 
 
0.0410 
 
    
 
  
[0.0714] 
 
    
 
parliamentarism 
 
0.247*** 
 
  0.166*** 
 
    [0.0564]     [0.0482]   
majoritarian 
  
0.199***     
 
   
[0.0561]     
 
mixt 
  
0.202**     
 
   
[0.0783]     
 
proportional 
  
0.0644     
 
      [0.0521]       
unitarism 
   
0.149***   
 
    
[0.0443]   
 
federalism 
   
0.356*** 0.0908 
 
        [0.0656] [0.0658]   
synergy 
   
    0.112*** 
    
    [0.0244] 
    
    
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 821 749 750 821 749 749 
R-squared 0.621 0.638 0.635 0.628 0.634 0.639 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Estimated coefficients in red are significantly higher to the democratic 
regime benchmark. Estimated coefficients in blue are significantly lower to the democratic regime 
benchmark. Time dummies or time trends are included for each regression. Robust regressions are ruling 
by using "rreg" command on STATA. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Reverse Causality 
 
Table f: Testing for reverse causality between financial development and political institution 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (11) 
  Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit Random_probit 
Ordered 
Random_probit 
VARIABLES democracy presidentialism semi_pres parliamentarism majoritarian mixt proportional unitarism federalism synergy 
                      
fi_depth -0.103 0.323 0.306 0.931 0.253 -0.349 -0.164 -0.391 0.625 -0.048 
  [0.187] [0.795] [0.685] [0.790] [0.355] [0.372] [0.281] [0.303] [0.970] [0.178] 
  
         
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 888 811 811 811 812 812 812 888 888 811 
Number of id 132 124 124 124 124 124 124 132 132 124 
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Each of this model controls for logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of (1+age of democraties), the proportion of neighboring countries (in 
our case, countries belonging to the same region) having the political institutions we seek to explain. In the case of the synergy variable, we introduce simultaneously the proportion of neighboring 
countries having parliamentary form of government and federal state form. All these models also include a time trend.  
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Supplementary material 
Estimating the effect of highly-inertial and non-randomly selected political institutions:  
 
 The non-random selection of political institutions:  
 
Table E (in appendix) clearly show that the observed pattern of political institutions in our sample 
depend on long-run geographic, historical and economic development factors (for instance colonial 
and legal origins, income per capita and also large waves of democratization associated with the 
adoption of specific forms of democracies), which is in line with Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
Moreover, these same long-run factors are also potentially correlated with financial development 
(especially legal origins), which induces an endogeneity risk of our political institutions variables if 
we do not account for these factors when estimating the effect of forms of democracies on financial 
development. 
 
Here, insofar as the main determinants of political institutions are long-run geographic, historical and 
development economic factors, a panel data models accounting for both observable heterogeneity with 
the introduction of control variables and unobservable individual and temporal heterogeneity with 
individual effects and time dummies, allows us to control in a fairly relevant way for the random 
selection problem of political institutions. 
 
Furthermore, in a short-term perspective, table G (in appendix) highlights that political institutions 
differ substantially along several economic variables representing first order determinants of financial 
development such as: trade and financial openness, inflation and inflation volatility and economic 
growth rate. Therefore, if we want to avoid any misleading correlation when assessing the effect of 
democratic political institutions on financial development, we need to account for these short-terms 
economic factors in our econometric specification.  
 
 The high inertia of political institutions:  
 
Because of the high inertia of political institutions, very few panel data estimator turn out to be 
appropriated for assessing the relationship between forms of democracies and financial development. 
Table A (in appendix) shows that among the 140 countries in our sample, only 55 countries knew at 
least one political transition from autocratic to democratic regime (and vice-versa) over 1984-2007. 
The remaining 85 countries are divided into 48 permanent democracies and 37 permanent autocracies. 
Moreover, we observed only 17 constitutional reforms in permanent democracies (mostly related to 
electoral rules reforms,  accounting for 14 of the 17 constitutional reforms) and only 9 constitutional 
reforms in countries with political transitions (also mostly related to electoral rules reforms, 
accounting for 7 of the 9 constitutional reforms). Therefore, as table D (in Appendix) shows, our 
political institutions variables, either political regimes or democratic political institutions, are 
characterized by a small within variability with respect to their between variability. 
 
Therefore, fixed effects models are not relevant for our study. Indeed, using a within transformation of 
our data results in assessing the relationship between forms of democracies and financial development 
only on the subset of the 55 countries which have experienced at least one political transition over 
1984-2007 and therefore to a sensible loss of precision of our estimates, leading to important 
difficulties to obtain evidences of a significant impact of our political institutions variables on 
financial development. Moreover, using a Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator, with the 
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introduction of country’s specific constants, risks to absorb most of the effects of our highly inertial 
political institutions variables and thus make them insignificant to explain financial development. 
In this case, random effects model could be a solution. However, even though it has the advantage of 
estimating relatively precisely the effects of highly inertial variables, it requires respecting the 
challenging orthogonality hypothesis between political institutions and random effects. This 
hypothesis is all the more likely to be respected if the variance proportion of our dependent variable 
explained by the random effects is relatively small, which is not the case in our study context as 
preliminary estimates have showed.
21
 A natural alternative could be to resort to the Hausman-Taylor 
estimator (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) for correlated random effects. Nevertheless, this estimator  is 
not suited for estimating the effects of highly inertial variables since it accounts for the correlation 
between explanatory variables and random effects by defining internal instruments including the 
within transformation of endogenous variables. Like a fixed effect model using a within 
transformation, the Hausman-Taylor estimator enables us to instrument our political institutions 
variables only for countries which have experienced at least one political transition over 1975-2007. 
This leads once again to a sensible loss of precision of our estimates and at the end to important 
difficulty to obtain evidences of a significant impact of our political institutions variables on financial 
development.
22
 
 
Another solution would consist in using a Propensity Score Matching estimator like Persson and 
Tabellini (2003, 2007) do. Recall that we seek to disaggregate the overall effect of democratic regimes 
on financial development with respect to dictatorships along eight types of democratic political 
institutions
23, i.e. eight “treatments” in the impact evaluation literature. As a result, it would require 
dividing our sub-sample of 37 permanents dictatorships in eight categories in order to find a proper 
autocratic counterpart for each democratic political institution we seek to assess the effect on financial 
development. Clearly, this would sensibly reduce the amount of available observations for each 
estimation, resulting in a dramatic increase in standard deviations associated to democratic political 
institution’s estimates and at the end to important difficulties to identify the effects of our forms of 
democracies variables on financial development. 
 
Finally, Huang (2010) and Yang (2011) use the System-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) 
to assess the relationship between democracies and financial development. Once again, because of the 
highly inertial nature of our political institutions variables, resorting to a first difference to remove 
individual unobserved heterogeneity in the difference equation and to instrument endogenous 
variables in the level equation, leads to evaluate the effects of our political institutions variables on 
financial development only for countries and periods characterized by at least one political transition. 
This reduces considerably the amount of available observations, resulting in a dramatic increase in 
standard deviations associated to political institution’s estimates and at the end to important 
difficulties to identify the effects of our political institutions variables on financial development. 
 
                                                          
21 When estimating the effects of political regimes and democratic political institutions on financial development, we systematically obtained 
a variance proportion of our dependent variable explained by the random effects above 70%. Results are available upon request. 
22 Moreover, the Mundlak’s (1978) correlated random effects model, consisting in the introduction of country specific average of 
endogenous variables in our econometric specification, is not appropriate for our study either. Like the Least Square Dummy Variable 
estimator, because of the highly inertial nature of our political institutions variables, the introduction of this new set of time invariant 
variables risk to absorb much of the explanatory power of our political institutions variables and thus make them insignificant to explain 
macroeconomic volatility. 
23 Parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential government forms, majoritarian, mixt and proportional electoral rules and federal and 
unitary state forms. 
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As a result, due to strong limitations imposed by our highly inertial political institutions variables, we 
think that the FEVD (Plümper and Troeger, 2007, 2011) represents the best (if not the only) solution 
for estimating the relationship between forms of democracies and financial development. This 
estimator is based on a three-stages procedure, dedicated to the estimation of time-invariant and rarely 
changing variables in panel data models with individual fixed effects. Moreover, Plümper and Troeger 
(2011), by answering to Greene (2011) and Breush et al. (2011), demonstrate that the FEVD procedure 
outperforms any other estimator in estimating models that suffer from the presence of time-varying 
variables correlated with unobserved individual effects and rarely changing variables, which 
corresponds to our situation. 
 
The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator of Plümper and Troeger 
(2007, 2011): 
 
In order to summarize the logic behind the FEVD estimator, we start with the following model:  
 
it it it i itY X W                                  (1) 
 
Yit, Xit and Wit respectively represent the dependent variable (i.e. financial development index), a 
highly inertial variable (i.e. a political institution variable) and a vector of control variables not 
characterized by high inertia.  is a constant term and i  represent individual fixed effects. 
 
In a first step, model (1) excluding the highly inertial variable Xit is estimated by OLS with a within 
transformation in order to extract the individual fixed effects ( i i i iY W     ):
( ) ( ) ( )it i it i it iY Y W W                                                            (2)  
   
In a second step, the predicted fixed effects of step 1 are regressed on the observed inertial variable so 
as to obtain the unexplained part ih  of the individual fixed effects. Therefore, the following equation 
is estimated by OLS:  
i it iX h                               (3) 
 
In a third step, the predicted unexplained part of the fixed effects ih  obtained in step 2 are introduce in 
the initial model (1) which is again estimated by OLS :  
it it it i itY X W h                                  (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
